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IN THE

SUPRE~ill

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

M. Bl\RNES COMPANY, a
corporation,

W.

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs

SOHIO NATURAL RESOURCES
COMPANY, a Corporation,
formerly SOHIO PETROLEUM
COMPANY, a Corpora ti on,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 1138

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil action to quiet title in real property
situated in Uintah County, State of Utah, and for damages.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
This matter came before the Honorable George E. Ballif,
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah
County, State of Utah, on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Appellant ordering that the Complaint be dismissed.
The court further ordered that Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Appellant on Count l of Respondent's Counterclaim be granted and Summary Judgment was therefore ordered
quieting title to the land in question in Respondent.

In grant-

ing Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment the Court held that
the uocuments before the Court spelled out the transaction between the Sponsored
parties
and established as a matter of law that said
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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transaction was a sale of the property rather than a mort

gage

thereon and that there were no issues of material facts to be
determined.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Lower Court's Order
granting

Respondent's

Motion for Summary Judgment reversed

and to have the case remanded to the District Court for a trial
on the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant,

w.

M. Barnes Company, is a corporation and is

hereinafter referred to as Barnes.

Respondent, Sohio

Petro~m

Company, is a corporation and is herEinafter referred to

ass~

On September 1, 1969, Barnes was the owner of a 37 1/2 percent
interest and Sohio was the owner of a 25 percent interest

in~

is referred to as the Asphalt Ridge Properties, in Uintah Count
State of Utah.

As of said date they entered into an agreement

along with others owning the remaining interest in said proper!
under the terms of which Sohio was to hold the full interest ol
said Asphalt Ridge Properties for the joint account of and inl
for all owners of said property, consisting of approximately 5
acres.

Also in this agreement, commonly referred to as an

Operating Agreement, the parties thereto agreed that Sohio sho
be the operator of said properties.
On October 7, 19 71, Barnes borrowed from the National Cit
Bank of Cleveland, located in Cleveland, Ohio, the sum of $SOO
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Page 3
which amount with interest was due and payable on December 29,
1972.

Barnes pledged and mortgaged its 37 1/2 percent interest

in the Asphalt Ridge Properties to the National City Bank of
Cleveland as security for said loan, and $500,000.00 was delivered to Barnes by the bank.
As security for said loan, Barnes, Sohio and the bank
entered into an Escrow Agreement dated October 7, 1971, under the
terms of which Sohio executed and delivered to Barnes on October
7, 1971, and placed in Escrow with the bank a letter which is
termed a Letter of Commitment.

Under the terms of said Letter

of Commitment, Sohio agreed to pay to Barnes at least $500,000.00
for its interest in said Asphalt Properties, and to have a preference right to purchase said properties at a sum equal to any
bona fide offer which Barnes may receive and be willing to accept
at any time prior to December 31, 1972.

Said letter also pro-

vided that Sohio should have 30 days after being notified by
Barnes of any of fer in which to decide whether or not to exercise
this preferential right.

In addition to said Letter of Commit-

ment, the ES8row Agreement also contained a Conveyance and Assignment, dated October 7, 1971, by which Barnes conveyed, assigned and transferred to Sohio all of its right, title and interest in said Asphalt Ridge Properties.
held in Escrow by the bank.

These documents were

The Letter of Commitment and the

Conveyance and Assignment were required by the bank as security
in making the loan.
On October 28, 1972, Barnes received an offer from Prudential
Funds, Inc.

to purchase Barnes' 37 1/2 percent interest in said

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Asphalt Ridge Properties for the sum of $500,000.00 in cash anc
a 5 year promissory note in the amount of $ 2, 000, 000 • oo

bea nno
·

interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the unpaid

bala:c:1

and a lease of said property to National Energy Corporation fm
a base period of 10 years subject to a royalty of 1/6 or $.GO
per barrel, whichever was greater.

On December 29, 19 7 2 Barnes

gave notice to Sohio by telephone, by telegram, and by letter
advising Sohio of Prudential's offer, and giving Sohio an opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal in the

purc~M

of the Asphalt Ridge Properties as agreed upon in the Letter cl
Commitment referred to above.

Barnes was not able to pay the National City Bank of 'Cleve

for the$ 500, 000. 00 loan on December 29,. 1972 and the bank, ther
fore, notified Sohio that the same had not been paid.

On

January 2, 1973 Sohio paid to the bank the principal amount of
said loan together with accumulated interest in the amount of
$444.44.

The bank subsequently, on that same day, assigned ib

interest under the Escrow Agreement dated October 7, 1971 W
Sohio.
Sohio is now and since January 2, 1973 has been the owner
and holder of the banks interest under the October 7, 1971
Escrow Agreement.

On the same day that Sohio paid for the as-

signment of the bank's interest on the Escrow Agreement, the t
delivere d the

.
d Conveyance an d Assi' gnrnent, datei
a f orementione

October 7, 19 71 which was held in es.crow, to Sohio.

Sohio sir

said date has held and continues to hold said Conveyance and
Assignment
inLaw Library.
its Funding
possession.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sohio refused to recognize and honor the offer to purchase
said properties by Prudential Funds, Inc. as communicated to
Sohio by Barnes on December 29, 1972 and has declined to exercise its preferential right to purchase Barnes' interest in
said Asphalt Ridge Properties by meeting the terms of Prudential's
offer as required in the October 7, 1971 Letter of Commitment
referred to above.

Sohio now claims to be the owner in fee of

the 37 1/2 percent interest of Barnes in the Asphalt Ridge
Properties by reason of the bank's assignment of interest in
said property to Sohio on January 2, 1973.
Never at any time did Barnes intend to sell the property
to Sohio for $500,000.00.

As evidenced by Prudential's October,

1972 offer to purchase the property, the property was worth many
times more than $500,000.00.

Barnes, at all times, intended

to repay to Sohio the amount Sohio paid to the National City
Bank of Cleveland in relieving Barnes of its obligation to the
bank under the October 7, 1971 loan agreement plus interest.
Never at any time has Sohio recorded any conveyance showing its
purported ownership in said property.
The Respondent made a motion for Summary Judgment contending that based on the pleadings and documents in evidence
there was no geniune issue as to any material fact and that
therefore the Respondent was entitled to a Judgment as a matter
of law.

Pursuant to the request of Appellant's counsel, a

hearing was held on the 12th day of January, 1979 and the court
issued its final ruling granting Sununary Judgment in favor of
Respondent and against Appellant.

Appellant now petitions the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Motion for Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT
WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR TRANSACTION WAS INTENDED BV
THE PARTIES THERETO AS A LOAN OR AS A SALE PRESENTS A·
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL FACT, PRECLUDING THE EN!
OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

II

Summary Judgment under rule 56 of the Utah Rul.es of1 Civil
Procedure is a harsh remedy in that it prevents litigants from
fully presenting their case to the court, and is only proper if
the Pleadings, Depositions, Affidavits and Admissions, having

been viewed in the light most favorable to the loser, show that/
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law"; sue:
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that the lmm
could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonabl:
sustain a Judgment in his favor.
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.

Bullock v. Dessert Dodge Trucl
2d 559 (1960).

The very nat1

of Summary Judgment has caused the courts to be very reluctant
to invoke this remedy.
Utah 2d, 353 P.2d 460

Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10
(1960).

In discussing Summary Judgment proceedings under rule 56 tl.
Utah Supreme Court in Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelit~
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P. 2d 685 I
stated that the sole purpose of Summary Judgment is to bar froi
the courts unnecessary and unjustified litigation, and on~~
i t clearly appears that the party against whom the Judgment wo'
be granted cannot possibly establish a right to recover should
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of such party when Surrunary Judgment against him is being considered.
In an even more recent case, Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d
1266 (1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a Motion for
summary Judgment provides a means for searching out the undisputed facts as shown by the Pleadings, Depositions, Admissions,
Answers to Interrogatories and Documents before the court; its
aim is to discover whether a controversy can be settled as a
matter of law, thereby saving both

court and litigants the time

trouble and expense of a trial; but because the party against
whom the Surrunary Judgment is entered is deprived of the privilege
of a trial, the record must be carefully scrutinized to see
if that party presents allegations which, if true, would entitle
him to Judgment.

If so, then Sununary Judgment is improper.

In another recent Utah case, Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542
P.2d 191 (1975), the Court

stated that it only takes one sworn

statement to dispute averments on the other side of controversy
and create an issue of fact, precluding Sununary Judgment.
In no area of the law have the courts across the nation been
more concerned about giving effect to the true intention of the
parties and, therefore, being more liberal in allowing parol and
extrinsic evidence to develop the facts and circumstances
surrounding the parties' actions than they have in cases where
it is contended by one of the parties that a deed absolute on
its face is in fact a mortgage.
present case.

Such are the facts of the

certainly, in instances such as those presented

by the facts of this case where the intention of the parties

has been Sponsored
viewed
byQuinney
theLaw Library.
courts
asdigitization
controlling,
Judgment
by the S.J.
Funding for
provided by the Institute ofSununary
Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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precluding the development of issues and facts by the parties
at trial is improper.
The following quotation is taken from 89 A. L. R. 2d 1041:
The fact that an instrument is in form a deed absol t
does not preclude the int7rpretation thereof as a mortga~e'.
The in~erpretation of an instrument as a mortgage, or
otherwise, presents a question to be decided from a
consider a ti on of the whole transaction, and not from any
particular feature from it.
The characterization of the
transaction by the parties in the instrument is not
conclusive.
The ultimate and essential point to be determined in \
every case in which it is thought to have an instrument of
transfer construed as a mortgage is the intention of ilie
parties or the object of the conveyance. To constitute
a mortgage for the payment of a sum of money or the
performance of some other act.
. If intended to secure
an obligation, it will be construed in equity as a mortgage1
and as possessing all the incidents thereof.
·

I
I

That the issue of whether or not a deed absolute on its faci 1
was intended as a mortgage presents "genuine issues of material
facts" which need to be fully developed by the litigants at
trial thereby making the Summary Judgment improper in such a
I

case is clearly shown by an examination of the Utah Statute and,
cases dealing with the subject.
The position of the Utah Legislature on the issue of whetherl
a deed absolute on its face was intended as a mortgage or a
conveyance is reflected in the following statute:
A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a
conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner
of the mortgage to recover possession of the real property
without a foreclosure and sale.
(UCA 78-40-8, 1953 as
amended).
Certainly this statute reflects the position of this legislature
in preventing the inequitable forfeiture of property in cases
dealing
similar
those
of the present casi
Sponsored by thewith
S.J. Quinneyfact
Law Library.situations
Funding for digitization provided
by the Institute ofto
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In 1908 the Utah Supreme Court decided Duerden v. Solomon
et. al., 33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978.

This was an action brought by

plaintiff to have an instrument purporting on its face to be a
deed declared a mortgage, and the title to the real estate described
therein quieted in plaintiff upon payment of the

mortgage indebtedness.

The court, after acknowledging that defendant testified that the
transaction was not a mortgage but that it was an absolute
purchase of the property, ruled against defendant and in favor
of plaintiff and stated as follows:
It is not contended that it was incompetent to show the
real object of the deed by evidence aliunde the instrument.
It is conceded that in cases such as this courts of equity
will look beyond the terms of the instrument to the real
transaction, and, when that is to be shown to be one of
security and not of sale, they will give effect to the
actual contract of the parties, and that the rule which
excludes parol evidence to contradict or vary written
instruments does not forbid an inquiry into the object
of the parties in executing and receiving the instrument.
Whether the instrument should be treated as a deed or
mortqage of course depends upon the facts and circumstances of the transaction, the object_ and purpose for which
it was given and received and whether it was given as
security or for a bargain and sale of the land.
In addition to the above-quoted factors the court noted
the existence of other "material facts" that had been developed
at trial in determining whether or not the transaction was
intended by the parties to be a mortgage or an absolute sale
and purchase, and stated:
The receipts and book entries are strong corroborative
evidence of the claim made by plaintiff that the transaction
had between him and the defendant was that of a loan, and
that there existed a continuing indebtedness. There was
also evidence showing that the value of the land was gr7atly
in excess of the amount paid by the defendant and that it
increased in value more than 25 percent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P.

232 ( 1918), an act;

brought to have a deed absolute in form declared a mor t gage,
and the same foreclosed the defendant~ as security to thep~
for all liabilities that might be incurred by the plaintiff~
the transaction, conveyed by deed a 74 acre farm to the p~~

I

The court, in holding that the transaction was a mortgnge,

quoted the exact language of the plaintiff and defendants de.J
·1

oped

at trial with respect to the giving of the deed and

sw

In our state a deed absolute in form, executerl. and:
delivered as security under a parol agreement and wiUt
understanding that it shall be so held, will be construe:
as a mortgage.
Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940 ( 1933), was a:I
action to impress the property involved with the trust in fav:j
of the plo.intiff subject to a mortgage lien, notwithstanding'
the absolute form of the conveyances, in which the court
held for the plaintiff and against the defendant.

a~~

In reachir,:

'1

its decision the court examined the testimony of the parti~
given at trial including the testimony of the plaintiff that
she gave the deed to the defendant as collateral and that

I

!

~

did not intend to part with title and ownership of the propert:
In stressing the importance of fully developing the nature~
the transaction involved through testimony and other evidP~ 1
trial the court said:
. ht)"/
In an equity case, and particularly one in whic
testimony is of such character that it is necessar~ fo'. ,,i
the trial court to base Findings of Fact upon imp11cat 10",
relations and behavior of the parties, and to ~eter~~'
the intention accompanying certain acts, relations, P
behavior, it is often difficult for a trial court to ,,
determine before the issues are well developed, as a tr.-·,
what
is
material
or Services
relevant and
Sponsored byproceeds,
the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Fundingtestimony
for digitization provided by
the Institute
of Museum and Library
and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
what Library
is Services
not.
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The court then continued by saying that "the testimony must
be

considered and weighed for the purpose of determining what

the nature and purposes of the instrument were."

The court then

indicated that:
In examining the evidence for the purpose of determining
whether the.deed is what upon its face it purports to be,
or whether it is a mortgage or an unconditional or a
conditional sale or imposed a trust . . . or otherwise,
parol evidence, extrinsic circumstances, and the relationship
of the parties may be resorted to, not for the purpose
of varying the terms of the written instrument, but for
the purpose of showing the object and purpose for which
the conveyance was made.
(Emphasis added).
It is an established doctrine that a court of equity
will treat a deed, absolute in form.as a mortgage, when
it is executed as security for a loan of money. That
court looks beyond the terms of the instrument to the
real transaction; and when that is shown to be one of
security, and not of sale, it will give effect to the
actual contract of the parties. As the equity, upon
which the court acts in such cases, arises from the real
character of the transaction, any evidence, written or
oral, tending to show this is admissible.
In determining whether the deed in this case, absolute
in its terms, was intended as a mortgage, the court listed

the essential elements, or "material facts, to be considered."
~ong

these "material facts" are the following:
Whether or not there was a continuing obligation
on the part of the granter to pay the debt or meet the
obligation which it is claimed the deed was made to secure;
the question of relative value; the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts; the declarations and admissions of the
parties· the form of the written evidences of the transactions'. the nature and character of the testimony relied
upon; the various business, social, or other relationship
of the parties; and the apparent aims and purposes to be
accomplished.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The court in holding that the transaction in question was
intended to secure a debt rather than as an absolute sale al~I
looked to the testimony of the parties and other evidence intrc:
at trial regarding that the value of the property involved, ~I
testimony as to the value of said property given on

behalf~~

plaintiffs and defendants ranged from a valuation of $54,500 to
$104,000.

The indebtedness to the defendant for which the deei

was given was approximately $48,000.

The court stated that tt.E:,

was a "substantial" difference between the total indebtedness
owed by plaintiff to defendant and the value of the

proper~

at the time of the conveyance which pointed to the fact that t:.'
transaction was intended as security for a debt rather thanu
an outright sale.
Subsequent Utah cases have all followed the guidelines se'.
for th in Corey v. Roberts (Supra)

in determining whether a tran:

action was intended merely as security for the payment of a deb~
or as a sale.

In all of these cases the court has looked beyon

1

the terms of any written instruments in an effort to determine
the real character of the transaction and the intention of t~
parties involved.

In Brown v. Skeen, 58 P. 2d 24, 89 Utah 568

(1936), the court quoted from Story Eq. Jur. section 1018
language that "the particular form or words of the conveyan~
are unimportant" but rather that the intent of the parties to
the transaction is controlling.

The court then, in emphasisin!

the importance of extrinsic evidence in determining the real

character of the transaction involved, cited Utah Code AnnoUb
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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section 78-40-8 which provides that "a mortgage of real
property shall not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms,
so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession
of the real property without a foreclosure and sale."

The court

then commented on this particular section of the code and stated
that it has "been many times referred to in the cases and construed.
A deed absolute in form may be shown to be a mortgage when it
is shown to be an instrument of security rather than one of sale."
The court in Thornley Land and Livestock Company v. Gailey,

105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943), although holding that the
transaction in question was a sale and not a mortgage, stated
that the controlling question in such a case was "what was the
situation of the parties and what was their intention" at the
time the agreement was executed.

The court continued by saying:

.It is not clear from the terms of the agreement whether
or not there was an obligation from plaintiff to defendant.
existing after the execution of the agreement. There is no
evidence as to relative values. A consideration of the
acts of the parties must in this instance be coupled with
and include their relationship and the apparent aims
and purposes to be accomplished.
The courts' statement that the controlling question in
determining whether a deed is a mortgage

i~

the parties intention

at the time of execution and delivery of the instrument was
stated by the court earlier that same year (1943) in Gibbons
v. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135 P.2d 105 (1943).

In holding

that a warranty deed, absolute in form, was not an absolute
conveyance of land to the grantee, but a mortgage in view of
the parties' contemporaneous written agreement providing that
llie conveyance was made to enable the grantee to obtain a loan
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on premises for a sum to be used in paying the mortgage th

I
I

erec:,
and that, if the grantor desired to sell the land the grantee :·

would convey title to the purchaser on payment to the grantee
of such amount, the court stated that "the fact that by the
terms of the contract, defendant had the right to sell the~~
to a third person, clearly indicated the intention of the part
that title should not pass to the defendant."

The court then

continued by terming transactions wherein a deed absolute upo;,
its face has been shown by parol evidence to have been given i::
security purposes only as "equitable mortgages."
In 1972 the Supreme Court decided a case with issues "~
similar to those involved in the case at hand.

In this 1972

case, Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d, 411, 497 P.2d 23, plaintifu
were in default on a mortgage on their home and, when i..;nable I
to refinance the ob ligation through the institutional mortgagee,\
were approached by defendants who proposed to refinance by
means of a security agreement in the form of an absolute
deed with an option to repurchase.

Plaintiffs contended that

the parties intended from its inception that the transact~n
was a loan, secured by a mortgage on plaintiffs' home.
Defendants urged that the transaction was a conditional sale, i.',
a sale with an option to repurchase at an advance price.
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment which was
granted by the trial court, and from which plaintiffs appealed.
This case, therefore, came to the Supreme Court on an appeal
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from the lower court's

granting of defendants Motion for summary

Judgment.
The court, in holding that under the circumstances of the
case, there was a "material issue of fact as to whether the
parties intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship and
whether the alleged sale was intended to be no more than a
security transaction", reversed the Judgment of the trial
court and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.

In so

doing the court stated:
In equity, a deed, absolute on its face, may be shown
by parol evidence to have been given for security purposes
only; and if such showing be made, equity will give effect
to the intention of the parties.
The court continued by stating:
Whether a transaction in the form of a sale with an
option to repurchase is in fact a sale, or a loan • •
is an issue for the trier of fact.
The controlling
question is what was the intention of the parties as it
existed at the time of the execution and delivery of
the instrument?
In determining the "material facts", to be decided by the
trier of fact the Utah Court stated:
If by the terms of the contract the granter has the
right to sell to a third person, such a fact is a clear
indication of the intention of the parties that title
should not pass to the grantee.
The court continued:
If there be a large margin between the debt or sum
advanced and the value of the land conveyed, this represents
an assurance of payment stronger than any promise or bond
of a necessitous borrower or debtor.
In Rizo v. Macbeth, Alaska, 398 P.2d 209 (1965), the
court decided circumstances relevant to the determination
of whether an instrument was a deed or a security device:
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.the adequacy or inadequacy of consideration as
compared to the value of the property, which is often
stated to be the single most important factor.
Retent
·
'
or nonre t ention
o f possession.
The conduct of the part'lOr.
before and after the execution of the instrument. The lei
financial condition of grantor at the time of execution
of the instrument.
The over-all relationship of the
parties--f inancial business, debtor-creditor, etc. Wheu,
the grantor or grantee paid the taxes.
The construction ..
of improvement after the execution of the deed. Whether
or not revenue stamps were affixed to the instrument.
There are others.
Generally it can be said that no 0 ~
of the circumstances is necessarily controlling, but
that all present are to be considered.'
The conclusion of the court was that "the disputed issues
as to material facts raised by the Pleadings, Interrogatories,
and the Affidavit were sufficient so as to preclude the

tr~!

court from granting Summary Judgment under Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
High Courts in states other than Utah have also ruled that
in determining whether an instrument in form an absolute deed
was intended as a mortgage, inadequacy of consideration, or
the fact that the value of the property was greater than t~
consideration for the deed, is a circumstance tending to show
that the deed was intended to operate as a mortgage.

In

Klingensmith v. Klingensmith, 193 Iowa 350, 185 N.W. 75 (1921),
plaintiff had borrowed sums aggregating about $900 from banks
by giving notes on which his father, since deceased, signed as
surety.

The father's estate consisted of $28,000 in real

property, and personal property of the value of $2,500.
to his father's death, plaintiff had executed to defendan

prior

t 51 hi

four brothers and sisters, a Quit Claim Deed of his expected
interest in the father's estate, when the banks pressed for
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payment of the notes and such defendants lent plaintiff money
to pay off the notes.

Plaintiff contended that the Quit Claim

deed was executed as security for the aforesaid advances, and
defendants contended that the instrument was an absolute
conveyance.

The court, in affirming a decree finding the

equities in favor of plaintiff in his suit to have the purported
deed cancelled and to have it construed as security for the
advances, after considering all the evidence, including that
detailed above, said:
When we compare the consideration in fact given
with the actual value of Ed's share in the decedent's
property it is grossly inadequate, and sufficient to charge
defendants with constructive fraud in their attempt to
preclude the rights of Edward • . . . the mathematics of
this case show that the plaintiff parted with about
$6,000 in value for consideration of less than $1,000.
Equity refuses to recognize such inequality.
The court said that it was clear that the Quit Claim Deed
did not express the true agreement between the parties, even
though it is conceded that Edward knew that he was signing a
Quit Claim Deed in the first instance, Edward himself not intending it to be other than a mere security in the event he
ever inherited anything from his father.

The court said that

defendants were entitled to take the monies, with interest,
advanced by them on Edward's behalf, but to take more would
be obnoxious to every sens~ of fairness, honesty, and right.
In this connection the court quoted from Stone v. Moody, 41
Washington 680, 84 P. 617, 85 P. 346,

(1906), where it was said:

we do not believe that a court in equity should
hesitate to interfere even though the victimized parties
owe their predicament largely to their own stupidity and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Also, in Mattes v. Smith, 149 Oregon 93,39 P.2d 676 (

19431

,

the court held an instrument to be a mortgage rather than a
deed where, in addition to other circumstances detailed by t~
court, the property, reasonably worth $32,000 and encumbered
by a mortgage of $1,000, was conveyed to defendants by plainti~

by an instrument, in the form of a deed, for the sole considerat::
$400, and it appeared also, at the time of the execution of
the instrument, the plaintiffs also executed a note in favor
of defendants of $400, and defendants as part of the same
transaction gave plaintiffs a 90 day option to purchase the
land for the amounts specified in the note.

The court stated

that it was highly improbable that plaintiffs would sell the
property in question for $400, and concurred in the opinion of
the trial Judge that there was no intention on the part of
plaintiffs to sell, or on the part of defendants to buy.
The foregoing examination of cases and authorities serves
to show the "material facts" examined by the court in determinin;
whether a transaction was intended as an instrument of security
or as an instrument of sale.

Certainly, with the courts

placing such great emphasis in these cases on the intentions of
the parties involved and the real character of the transaction
and in considering the courts policy against forfeiture, it
would be a rare instance where Summary Judgment would be
appropriate under facts similar to those in the cases above
cited.

Such is the case in Barnes v. Sohio.
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During the oral arguments which were held by the court
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, Judge
Ballif commented from the bench that because in this case the
language appearing within the four corners of the documents
involved was unambiguous, parol and extrinsic evidence could
not be considered in determining the true nature of the
transaction involved.

This is certainly not the position

other courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have taken.
The forfeiture of property is a serious matter and certainly
presents issues which cannot be determined on Summary Judgment
by an examination of the language contained within the four
corners of the instruments involved.
On factual issue that needs to be resolved through the
means of all discovery procedures legally available to the parties,
including trial, and over which there is a dispute in this case
as evidenced by the Pleadings and other documents on file herein,
is the intentions of the parties to the transaction at the time
the agreement was executed.

Barnes in its complaint, states that

it pledged and mortgaged its

37~

percent interest in the Asphault

Ridge Properties to the National City Bank of Cleveland as
security for said loan the bank required Sohio to execute and
deliver to the bank the letter which has been termed a Letter
of Commitment.

Barnes states that at no time did it intend to

sell the property to Sohio for $500,000.

Sohio, on the other

hand, claims that the transaction was an out right sale of the
property.
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On page 65 of the Deposition of W. M. Barnes, President~
the plaintiff corporation, taken on the 17th day of March,

197!,

Mr. Barnes explains his understanding of the agreement:
Q.

Now was it your understanding that you had signed a
conveyance when you entered into the Escrow Agree~nD

A.

It was my understanding that I pledged my 37~ percent
interest in the Asphault Ridge Properties to guarantee:
a note that I had issued for $500,000 for the company.'

Mr. Barnes also testified that Mr. Harry Pforzaheimer
representing Sohio suggested to him that the way to handle a
transaction was for the parties to execute the Letter of
Commitment to show that the property was worth at least that
much money, namely, $500,000.

Based on said letter, the

ba~

would loan the money.
Certainly, this testimony of W. M. Barnes and the allegatio,.
contained in the Pleadings on file in this case raise an issueo'.
"material fact" which cannot be determined by the court on
Summary Judgment.

Another issue of fact over which there is a

dispute in this case and which makes Summary Judgment inappropria
is the actions of the parties subsequent to the transaction
involved.

In this case, the treatment by the bank of the note

after it had been paid by Sohio is interesting.

Item 5 of

defendants memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment sets forth a copy of the note on page 1, and on the
second page sets forth the endorsement by the bank on the note
when it was paid and states:
Assigned to Sohio Petroleum Company without recourse,
The National City Bank of Cleveland.
By G. F. Carpenter,
Vice
and
Cashier.
Executed
January
2, 1973.
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As further evidence of what the bank did and its understanding of the agreement it wrote a letter to Barnes on
January 4, 1973, which appears as defendants exhibit DB in

w.

M. Barnes' Deposition and is item 8 in Sohio's Memorandum.

In this letter to Mr. Barnes the bank states:
In accordance with the Escrow Agreement between our
bank, yourself and the Sohio Petroleum Company, we notified
Sohio Petroleum Company on December 29, 1972, that,the
$500,000 note had not been paid, and we, therefore,
assigned the note for $500,000 to the Sohio Petroleum
Company without recourse to this bank on January 2, 1973.
The testimony of a disinterested third party as t0 its
understanding of the transaction between Barnes and Sohio would
certainly be helpful to the court in ascertaining the intentions
of the parties at the time they entered into the transaction
and certainly presents an issue of material fact precluding
the entry of Summary Judgment.
Another issue of material fact to be decided in. this case is
a comparison of the value of the property described in the deed
with the amount of the debt.

In its Complaint Barnes alleges

that Prudential Fund, Inc. had offered to purchase the 37~
percent interest of Barnes in the Asphault Ridge Properties
for $500,000 cash and a five year promissory note in the amount
of 2 million dollars bearing interest ,a,.t 6 percent per annum
on the unpaid balance.

This allegation is supported by W. M.

Barnes' Deposition pages 51-60 wherein he testified as to the
terms of the deal between Barnes and Prudential and the written
correspondence between the parties relating thereto.

This offer
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by Prudential is some indication of the value of the proper~
involved.

In W. M. Barnes' Deposition he testified that never

at any time had he agreed or intended to sell property worth
approximately $ 2, 500, 000 to Sohio for $ 500, 000.

If this were

a straight conveyance to Sohio, as Sohio contends, why would
the parties have given Sohio the right to meet any other offer
to purchase the property?

Certainly, these allegations of

Barnes contained in the Pleadings and in the Deposition present
an issue of material fact which cannot be resolved on Summary
Judgment.
The manner in which the parties treated the property in
their business records and accounting books is also a material
issue in determining the real nature of the transaction.

In

W. M. Barnes' Deposition, pages 74-77, Mr. Barnes testified
that plaintiffs accounting books reflected a $500,000 debt
owed to Sohio by reason of the banks assignment of its interest
to Sohio under the terms of the agreement.

There is no

indication in the records of how Sohio treated the protierty
on its books.

This then, presents another issue to be

dete~

mined by the court at trial and not on Summary Judgment.

Also,

the fact that Sohio has never recorded the deed is helpful in
I

determining the intention of the parties.'
CONCLUSION
.cle1if>ly··-•,. uhoar facts such as t h ose presen t e d by this case
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a sale, it is essential in determining the true nature and
character of the transaction that all material facts be fully
developed and presented by the parties through all legal avenues
available, including trial.

An examination of the Pleadings

and other documents on file in this case has revealed that there
are many factual disputes in this case relating to factors
on which the court, in prior cases, have placed great emphasis
in determining the true nature and character of the transaction
involved.

In a case such as this one where appellant

stands

to forfeit all its interest in property valued at many times
the amount of the debt secured, it is especially important
that all issues and facts be fully developed and that the
testimony of the parties and other witnesses by heard by the
trier of fact.
The disputed issues as to material facts raised by the
Pleadings, Affidavits, Depositions and other documents on file
herein are sufficient so as to render the granting of Summary
Judgment by the trial court under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure inappropriate.

The facts and circumstances of this

case require that a trial be

ha~,

and that full discovery and

presentation of the evidence to the court be made.
DATED this

/

'1

day of July, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

BY

~f.4tRd~

DUANE ~ FRANDEN
Frandsen, Keller & Je11sen
Attorneys for Appellant
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